A sectoral anatomy of the Spanish productivity puzzle by Cuadrado Salinas, Pilar et al.
A SECTORAL ANATOMY OF THE SPANISH 
PRODUCTIVITY PUZZLE 2020
Pilar Cuadrado, Enrique Moral-Benito  
and Irune Solera
Documentos Ocasionales 
N.º 2006 
A SECTORAL ANATOMY OF THE SPANISH PRODUCTIVITY PUZZLE
A SECTORAL ANATOMY OF THE SPANISH 
PRODUCTIVITY PUZZLE (*)
Pilar Cuadrado, Enrique Moral-Benito and Irune Solera 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA
Documentos Ocasionales. N.º 2006
2020
(*) We thank Brindusa Anghel, Diego Comín and Mario Izquierdo for useful comments.
The Occasional Paper Series seeks to disseminate work conducted at the Banco de España, in the 
performance of its functions, that may be of general interest.
The opinions and analyses in the Occasional Paper Series are the responsibility of the authors and, therefore, 
do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem. 
The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most of its publications via the Internet on its 
website at: http://www.bde.es. 
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is 
acknowledged. 
© BANCO DE ESPAÑA, Madrid, 2020 
ISSN: 1696-2230 (on-line edition)
Abstract
Income per capita in Spain relative to that of other advanced EU countries held stable at 
around 90% from 2000 to 2016. Stagnant labour productivity is at the root of this lack 
of convergence. This paper examines these developments from a sectoral perspective 
based on recently released EU KLEMS data. Our main findings are as follows: i) Spain 
has lower productivity levels vis-à-vis other EU countries in most sectors, with only 
4 out of 23 sectors exhibiting higher productivity in Spain: accommodation and food 
services, agriculture, electricity and gas supply, and information and communication services; 
moreover, the allocation of employment towards low-productivity sectors accounts for 
half of the aggregate Spain-EU productivity gap in levels; ii) turning to the changes in the 
2000-2016 period, the overall lack of convergence is driven by a divergence in productivity 
relative to EU countries, especially within services sectors; iii) while both ICT (Information 
and Communication Technology) and non-ICT capital in Spain converged towards 
European levels, Total Factor Productivity (TFP) divergence in most sectors explains the 
lack of convergence in labour productivity. Finally, we explore one potential explanation for 
this pattern: the TFP divergence and ICT capital convergence can be rationalised in the 
presence of complementarities between ICT-capital and labour force skills. Indeed, our 
industry-country regression analysis suggests that the dismal performance of Spanish 
TFP might be related to the significant deficit in the population’s skills as proxied by 
PIAAC-OECD scores.
Keywords: labour productivity, Total Factor Productivity, productivity gap, labour force skills.
JEL classification: D24, C23.
Resumen
Entre 2000 y 2016, la renta per cápita en España permaneció estable y representó en torno 
al 90 % en relación con otros países avanzados de la Unión Europea (UE). Esta falta de 
convergencia se debe en gran medida al estancamiento de la productividad laboral en 
España. Este documento analiza este hecho desde una perspectiva sectorial, empleando 
los datos recientemente publicados por EU KLEMS. Se observa que España presenta 
unos niveles de productividad más bajos en comparación con otros países de la UE en 
la mayoría de los sectores: solo 4 de los 23 sectores analizados muestran un mayor nivel 
de productividad. Además, la asignación de empleo a sectores de baja productividad 
representa la mitad de la brecha de productividad agregada entre España y la UE. En cuanto 
a los cambios del período 2000-2016, la falta de convergencia se debe a una divergencia 
en los niveles de productividad en relación con los países de la UE, especialmente en el 
sector servicios. Finalmente, mientras que el capital tecnológico (TIC) y el no tecnológico 
convergían hacia los niveles europeos, el bajo crecimiento de la productividad total 
de factores (PTF) en la mayoría de los sectores explica la falta de convergencia en la 
productividad laboral. Una posible explicación a la divergencia de la PTF y la convergencia 
del capital tecnológico podría ser la presencia de complementariedades entre el capital 
tecnológico y las habilidades de la fuerza laboral. De hecho, el análisis sectorial y por país 
realizado sugiere que el bajo crecimiento de la PTF española podría estar relacionado con 
un déficit significativo de las habilidades de la población, como indican los resultados 
obtenidos en el PIAAC-OCDE.
Palabras clave: productividad laboral, productividad total de los factores, gap 
de productividad, habilidades de la fuerza laboral.
Códigos JEL: D24, C23.
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1 Introduction
The ratio of Spanish GDP per capita to that of other EU countries stood at 90% in 2000. 
Surprisingly enough, this figure remained unchanged in 2016 in spite of the cyclical fluctuations. 
In this article, we explore the industry developments behind this lack of convergence since 
the year 2000. The remainder of this introduction offers details of the different sections and 
findings of the paper, which should allow the reader to grasp the essence of our contribution.
Section 2 describes the datasets at the industry-country level that allow us to 
analyse the productivity gap between Spain and other European countries from a sectoral 
perspective. More specifically, we study the labour productivity gap by industry, looking at 
both levels and changes between 2000 and 2016. On the one hand, Eurostat data permit 
analysis of the levels in selected years provided appropriate purchasing power parity 
adjustments are used. On the other, data taken from the EU KLEMS database enable the 
evolution over time of the labour productivity gap by sector to be dissected in terms of 
its input contributions (labour composition, ICT capital and non-ICT capital) along with the 
contribution of total factor productivity.
Section 3 describes aggregate Spanish GDP per capita vis-à-vis other European 
countries. According to the latest data published by Eurostat for 2018, GDP per capita in 
PPP stood at €28,113 in Spain, against €30,963 per person on average in the European 
Union. These figures mean a ratio of around 90%, very close to that of the year 2000 in spite 
of the cyclical fluctuations that increased the ratio during the boom but dampened it during 
the crisis years. The decomposition of GDP per capita into GDP per hour worked (labour 
productivity), average hours per worker and the employment rate allows us to conclude 
that the dismal performance of Spanish labour productivity is largely responsible for the 
persistent gap in GDP per capita. This is so because the lower employment rate in Spain is 
offset by the higher average hours per employee worked, meaning that Spanish hours per 
capita are broadly in line with other European countries in both 2000 and 2016.
Section 4 turns to the detailed industry-level anatomy of the labour productivity 
gap between Spain and other advanced European countries. Section 4.1 focuses on PPP-
adjusted levels and concludes that most sectors in both industry and services exhibit 
negative productivity gaps. Indeed, there are only 4 out of 231 sectors in which Spain has 
higher productivity levels with respect to other countries over the whole period, namely, 
accommodation and food services, agriculture, electricity and gas supply, and, to a lesser 
extent, information and communication services. We also calculate the sector-specific 
contributions to the overall productivity gap and find that the contribution of services to 
the overall negative gap is significantly larger than that of manufacturing. The professional 
services sector stands out as that with the highest negative contribution to the overall 
productivity gap (4.6 pp out of –9.3 pp in 2016). Our levels decomposition analysis also 
1   Without taking into account coke and refined petroleum products, which are very volatile and subject to price fluctuations 
that are difficult to account for by means of PPP adjustments.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 9 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 2006
suggests that around half of the productivity gap in 2016 can be explained by the allocation 
of employment towards low-productivity activities, i.e. low-productivity sectors exhibit 
relatively high employment shares vis-à-vis other European countries.
Section 4.2 analyses the evolution over time of the contributions to the productivity gap 
discussed in section 4.1. The overall lack of convergence between Spain and other countries 
from 2000 to 2016 is due to a deterioration in the contribution from manufacturing and 
construction that is partly offset by improvements in the contribution of the services sector. 
Interestingly, the improvement in the contribution of services is only the result of a greater 
tertiarisation of employment in Spain despite the across-the-board divergence in productivities 
vis-à-vis EU12 in virtually all services subsectors.2 In contrast, we observe a different pattern for 
the manufacturing sector: a very modest improvement in relative productivities with respect to 
EU12 countries that is offset by a fall in the relative employment shares of most manufacturing 
subsectors. All in all, the divergence of whole-economy productivity is due, mainly, to a 
deterioration in relative labour productivities in services. 
Section 4.3 analyses the lack of convergence in Spanish productivity vis-à-vis other 
European countries in terms of input contributions and TFP by sector. Recently released EU 
KLEMS data provide useful information to calculate the contributions to labour productivity 
growth of labour composition, ICT capital, non-ICT capital and TFP. Significantly, all three 
inputs contributed positively to closing the productivity gap: investment in both ICT and 
non-ICT capital was higher in Spain, and the composition of the labour force in terms of 
education, for instance, improved more in Spain than in the other EU12 countries. In contrast, 
the convergence in terms of inputs used was more than offset by a strong divergence in 
terms of TFP, meaning that the overall (negative) productivity gap widened slightly. These 
patterns are common to most sectors in both manufacturing and services.
Section 5 sheds some light on the TFP divergence puzzle. Schivardi and Schmitz (2019) 
show that the dismal performance of TFP in Southern European countries with respect to Germany 
is mostly due to inefficient management practices hampering the benefits of the IT revolution. In 
this connection, we find evidence in favour of an alternative but related hypothesis: in order to 
benefit from the IT revolution, what is needed is not only efficient management practices but also 
a trained labour force to complement ICT capital investments. However, according to PIAAC 
scores (Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies), Spanish adults 
would be less prepared than their European counterparts to exploiting such complementarities 
even for a given level of formal educational attainment. Indeed, our regression evidence at the 
country-industry level suggests that investments in ICT capital result in significantly higher 
TFP gains when the country’s population has higher PIAAC scores. Our back-of-the-envelope 
counterfactuals suggest that if the Spanish scores in PIAAC had moved from the current 
5th percentile to the level of Finland (95th percentile), labour productivity growth would have 
doubled, leading to a relatively strong convergence of 5 pp over the whole 2000-2016 period.
2  The rise of services (and the fall in manufacturing) over this period might be related to the belated structural transformation 
of the Spanish economy with respect to other advanced European countries [see González-Díez and Moral-Benito (2019)].
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2 Datasets at the industry-country level
In this section we describe the labour productivity data from Eurostat and summarise the 
growth accounting decomposition provided by EU KLEMS. We find that the measures of 
labour productivity growth from Eurostat and EU KLEMS coincide since they are both rooted 
in statistics from the National Accounts.
2.1 Data from Eurostat and PPP adjustment
Estimating productivity levels by industry are fraught with many measurement difficulties. 
By definition, a measure of productivity needs to put a volume measure of output in 
proportion to a volume measure of inputs. In our sectoral analysis, labour productivity is 
computed as value added per hour worked in each sector. In an international context, 
to make volume comparisons, value added is required to be converted into a common 
unit that takes into account the direct price differentials among countries, therefore 
current value added is converted into purchasing power parities (PPPs).3 Under these 
“current PPPs” conversions, comparisons between countries within a specific year are 
straightforward as volumes are measured with the same price structure. However, inter-
temporal comparisons requires eliminating the effect of inflation over time. Then, to combine 
spatial and temporal comparisons, we decided to replicate the relative movements of 
value added growth in volumes in each country by fixing a “base” year and extrapolating4 
PPPs over time,5 and thus obtain “constant PPPs”.6
The main difference between “current PPPs” and “constant PPPs” is that the 
former capture changes in volume as well as changes in relative prices while “constant 
PPPs” only capture volume changes. Even if the volumes of goods and services remain 
identical over time, a productivity comparison based on “current PPPs” may change over 
time if prices and price structures shift.7 Following the recommendation of the OECD 
[Schreyer and Koechlin (2002)], we use “constant PPPs” choosing 2010 as the base year in 
line with the used statistics from National Accounts. Furthermore, given that data on PPPs 
are not available at sectoral level, we use economy-wide PPPs with 2010 as the base year 
assuming the global economy price structure in all industries of that year in each country.
2.2 Growth accounting data from EU KLEMS
The EU KLEMS database is designed for the analysis of growth patterns of advanced 
economies, and especially, the evolution of productivity growth and its determinants 
[O´Mahony and Timmer (2009)]. Labour productivity growth can be decomposed into 
3 PPPs refer to the ratio of prices in national currencies of the same good and service in different countries.
4  Extrapolation can be done by applying the relative rates of inflation observed in different countries to the base year PPPs.
5   The main drawback with other approaches that use a fixed base is the assumption that price structures do not change 
over time. Another consequence of fixing price structures at a base year is that results depend on the choice of the 
base year.
6  Using “constant PPPs” produces the same result than applying volume growth rates of added value to the comparative 
added value levels of the base year, i.e., current added value in PPPs.
7  This factor comes into play when some countries are large producers and exporters of products with marked price changes.
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contributions of capital intensity (also called capital deepening), labour quality and TFP. 
Capital intensity is measured as the amount of real capital in relation to labour. It is calculated 
as capital services derived from the stock of physical assets and intellectual property assets, 
divided by hours worked. Labour quality is captured through the labour composition that 
measures the effect of shifts in the age, education and gender composition of the workforce 
on the efficiency of hours worked.
The dataset provides industry-level growth accounting data for 28 countries and 
4 aggregates (EU12, EU20, EU11 and EU19).8 One of its key advantages is the ability 
to quantify separately the impact of ICT and non-ICT assets. EU KLEMS breaks down 
labour productivity growth estimated as value added per hour growth into: 1) TFP growth; 
2) the contribution of ICT capital [split into tangible information and communication (ICT) 
and three types of intangible capital: software and databases, R&D and other innovative 
property products]; 3) the contribution of non-ICT capital (buildings and construction, 
machinery, transport equipment and cultivated assets); 4) the contribution of labour quality. 
It is worth highlighting that EU KLEMS information is based on growth rates but does not 
allow comparing productivity levels. The interested reader is referred to Annex 1 for more 
formal details on the EU KLEMS methodology and assumptions.
2.3 Sample coverage and definition of European benchmark
In order to compare the performance of the Spanish labour productivity over time with 
other European countries, choosing a European benchmark is crucial but is not exempt 
of difficulties. A common approach is to compare the country under study with the best 
performers or leading countries. As we need consistency between the analysis using data 
from Eurostat and EU KLEMS, the same benchmark needs to be selected. However, the 
EU KLEMS dataset does not allow building aggregates for the growth accounting exercise 
and we are thus constrained by their computed aggregates. In the latest 2019 released 
data, two country aggregates are computed from 2000 onwards: EU129 and EU11, which is 
EU12 without the United Kingdom. EU12 is then used as our benchmark which includes the 
following countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. In this sample the best performers in 
terms of labour productivity levels are included: Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, 
Finland and France. Moreover, the availability of the EU KLEMS information from 2000 to 
2016 also determines the time period considered in our analysis.
Turning to the industry classification, we consider 23 industries based on NACE-Rev 2, 
including 11 sub-categories in the manufacturing sector and 8 sub-categories in services. 
We decided to exclude from our analysis the real estate sector because its value added per 
hour worked is distorted by the inclusion of imputed rents of owner-occupied dwellings. 
The reasons are that owner occupied dwellings are typically not regarded as productive 
8 EU12 is the aggregate used in this study. See section 2.3.
9 EU20 is also provided but only with data from 2009 onwards. We decided not to use it given the short time span.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 2006
capital, and also, they are produced without any additional measured of hours worked 
artificially inflating the estimates of labour productivity in the real estate sector.
Finally, we check that productivity growth series from Eurostat and EU KLEMS are 
comparable. Chart 1 provides the productivity growth rates from Eurostat and EU KLEMS 
and they both coincide over time. Therefore, the analyses provided in the different sections 
of this study are based on comparable data series, which is reassuring since both series are 
rooted in statistics from the National Accounts.
REAL GROWTH VALUE ADDED PER HOUR WORKED. COMPARISONS EUROSTAT WITH EU KLEMS DATA
Chart 1
SOURCES: Eurostat and EU KLEMS.
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3 The lack of convergence in standards of living
GDP per capita is the most commonly used proxy of standards of living across countries. 
A simple accounting decomposition allows identifying the sources of its evolution in terms 
of labour productivity, hours worked and the employment rate. In particular, real GDP per 
capita can be broken down as follows:
 
Population
Employment
Employment
Hours
Hours
GDPReal
Population
GDPReal
⋅⋅=                         [1]
The first term of the right hand in the equation [1] consists of the contribution of 
labour productivity. The second and third terms focus on the role of labour markets measured 
in terms of hours per worker in an economy and the contribution of the employment rate 
heavily influenced by demographics. Note that the main object of interest throughout 
the paper is the so-called gaps, defined as the ratio of each component of equation [1] in 
Spain to that of EU12. 
Income per capita in Spain relative to that of other advanced EU countries remained 
broadly unchanged from 2000 to 2016. In fact, in both 2000 and 2016 Spain shows a gap 
in terms of both GDP per capita and labour productivity close to 0.9 relative to our EU12 
benchmark (see Charts 2.1 and 2.2). The employment rate gap follows a highly procyclical 
pattern, though the ratio against EU12 is slightly lower in 2016 than in 2000. Lastly, the gap 
in hours worked per worker has remained broadly unchanged over the whole period with 
a ratio vis-à-vis EU12 above 1 indicating that in Spain hours worked per worker are higher 
than those of EU12 countries. 
During the first years following the introduction of the common currency Spain 
started a steady income convergence towards several advanced European economies 
(see Chart 2.1). However, during the years of recession, the marked deterioration of the 
economy prompted a clear brake in convergence, moving away from the EU12 GDP per 
capita. Since the economic recovery that started in 2014, in spite of registering a sustained 
economic growth above the European average, the Spanish economy has not reached a full 
convergence with its European peers. All in all, the Spanish economy has not improved its 
relative position towards EU12 in terms of GDP per capita between 2000 and 2016. 
As shown in Chart 2, cyclical fluctuations in the GDP per capita gap are mainly 
driven by the employment rate,10 with substantially higher job creation dynamics in Spain 
during the expansion and stronger job destruction rates during the recession. The labour 
productivity gap also presents a mild cyclical pattern but much more muted than that of 
employment: the years of high employment creation have been characterised by a slight 
reduction in the labour productivity gap that was reversed after the Global Financial Crisis. In 
any event, while the Spain-EU12 employment gap oscillates between below 0.85 and above 
10 Note that the cyclical pattern of employment is also observed at sectoral level (see Chart A2.1 in Annex 2).
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1.00, the range of variation of the labour productivity gap is much smaller and the ratio is 
always below 0.90. These patterns indicate that the secular gap in labour productivity is at 
the root of the lack of convergence in GDP per capita of Spain with respect to EU12.
Finally, it is worth highlighting that the evolution of Spanish GDP per capita vis-
à-vis our EU12 benchmark masks some heterogeneity across large Eurozone countries. 
For instance, Chart 2 shows a strong convergence process between Spain and Italy in 
terms of both GDP per capita and labour productivity. On the contrary, GDP per capita and 
the employment rate diverged significantly between Spain and Germany together with a 
relatively constant labour productivity gap. Turning to the gaps of Spain vis-à-vis France, 
they have all evolved very similarly to the EU12 aggregate gaps between 2000 and 2016.
SPAIN GDP PER CAPITA CONVERGENCE AND ITS DETERMINANTS RELATIVE TO OTHER EUROPEAN ECONOMIES
Chart 2
SOURCE: Eurostat.
NOTE: In this chart labour productivity is calculated as GDP per hour worked while in the rest of the document ilabour productivity is computed as 
value added per hour worked, therefore small differences can be found with the data plot in these charts and the data of labour productivity shown in 
the rest of the document.
a Employment is measured in hours worked.
b Employment rate defined as the ratio of total employment and total population.
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4 Labour productivity gap by sector
A detailed sector-level analysis of productivity levels of Spain vis-à-vis its European peers 
and their time profile could be crucial for several reasons. First, future productivity growth 
prospects partly depend upon the current gap with the country leaders, the higher the level 
gap, the larger the scope for improvements in productivity growth in Spain. Second, with a 
higher productivity gap, the Spanish economy will have a lower capacity to compete with 
other countries for factors of production given that cost competitiveness and productivity 
gaps are expected to be negatively related. Third, the industries in which Spain´s 
productivity levels are consistently below (above) its European peers are expected to have 
a comparative disadvantage (advantage) vis-à-vis their counterparts. In this context, a 
detailed analysis of the industries performance in comparison with a European benchmark 
could help to identify which sectors have contributed to a greater or lesser extent to the 
relatively weak productivity performance of the Spanish economy, and therefore extract 
the most vulnerable aspects of our economy that have been preventing its convergence 
towards a European benchmark.
It is worth highlighting that two main measures of productivity can be considered: 
labour productivity or total factor productivity (TFP). Labour productivity relates output to 
the single input of employment (or capital in the case of the other single input) while total 
factor productivity relates an index of output to a composite index of all inputs. The most 
comprehensive measure of productivity is TFP, because it measures the efficiency of all 
inputs. However, we use labour productivity for two main reasons: i) it is a direct determinant 
of per capita GDP (as shown in equation [1]) as a proxy for living standards; ii) it is easy 
to understand, estimate and compare internationally as it entails few data requirements 
in comparison to TFP, that is usually estimated as a residual and makes more difficult level 
comparisons across countries. 
4.1 The sectoral productivity gap in levels
Using sectoral data on constant PPPs value added and total hours worked, we compute 
estimates of the ratio of Spain and EU12 labour productivity level for 23 sectors (see Table 1). 
According to our estimates, for the whole economy, the relative labour productivity level vis-
à-vis EU12 has not narrowed over the period under study. In 2000, the labour productivity 
level in Spain in the total economy was 8.7% (ratio of 0.91) below the EU12 and has not 
diminished since then.
The Spain-EU12 ratio is below one in all years for both manufacturing and services. 
Indeed, Spain presents a productivity advantage (ratio above one in all years) for only 
4 out of 23 sectors vis-à-vis other EU countries, namely, accommodation and food services, 
agriculture, electricity and gas supply, and, to a lesser extent, information and communication 
services (see Table 1). On the contrary, sectors such as wholesale and retail trade, and 
professional services displayed the lowest productivity levels relative to EU12, with ratios 
below 0.8, which means that the productivity level in Spain in those sectors is 20% below 
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the EU12. Within the industrial sector, the lowest productivity levels are observed in labour 
intensive industries such as textiles and clothing, and in some capital intensive industries 
such the chemical sector, electrical an optical equipment and transport equipment.
An interesting feature to take into consideration is to what extent the productivity 
differences are due to the Spanish sectoral specialization instead of productivity differentials 
within each sector. Indeed, aggregate labour productivity differences may occur within 
RELATIVE LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY SPAIN VS EU12 
Constant 2010 PPPs
Table 1
SOURCE: Banco de España based on Eurostat.
a Constant 2010 PPPs.
b Real estate not included.
Sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2000 2007 2013 2016 ES EU12 ES EU12
0.00010.000100.3390.9219.019.058.019.0U-A)b( ymonoce latoT
25.397.461.1281.2250.120.178.057.0B-Agninim dna erutlucirgA
63.360.470.5130.1263.133.132.102.1AerutlucirgA    
61.020.010.43130.4433.024.062.012.0Bgniyrrauq dna gniniM    
98.4123.3126.6493.4459.039.078.098.0E-Crotces lairtsudnI
45.3100.2185.3459.9329.009.048.088.0CgnirutcafunaM    
        Food products; beverages and tobacco products C10-C12 0.89 0.99 0.90 0.81 28.54 35.27 2.72 2.05
        Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products C13-C15 0.79 0.81 0.86 0.75 18.81 24.96 0.91 0.69
        Wood, paper, printing and reproduction C16-C18 1.02 0.94 0.95 0.81 26.31 32.38 0.96 1.02
        Coke and refined petroleum products C19 1.32 1.15 0.79 3.91 1,014.74 259.61 0.05 0.05
        Chemicals and chemical products C20-C21 0.88 0.81 0.80 0.75 68.02 90.21 0.86 0.81
        Rubber and plastic products and other 
        non-metallic mineral products C22-C23 1.08 0.93 1.03 0.99 36.31 36.57 0.97 1.25
        Basic metals and fabricated metal products, 
        except machinery and equipment C24-C25 1.08 0.92 1.14 1.23 45.77 37.26 1.71 2.14
21.106.030.5581.5428.038.097.067.072C-62Ctnempiuqe lacitpo dna lacirtcelE        
15.187.071.1401.4338.019.077.028.082C.c.e.n tnempiuqe dna yrenihcaM        
73.190.158.4649.6427.009.058.047.003C-92Ctnempiuqe tropsnarT        
        Other manufacturing; repair and installation 
        of machinery and equipment C31-C33 0.81 0.79 0.91 0.88 25.16 28.68 1.35 1.54
91.141.162.1899.0921.160.111.111.1E-Dylppus sag dna yticirtcelE    
51.763.604.6251.4392.153.188.070.1FnoitcurtsnoC
06.4707.5705.1355.7278.088.068.029.0U-G)b( secivreS
58.4119.8150.9297.1257.067.027.097.0Gedart liater dna elaselohW    
52.556.430.2309.0369.019.058.080.1Hegarots dna noitatropsnarT    
43.550.833.9169.7254.174.193.196.1Isecivres doof dna noitadomoccA    
    Information and communication services J 1.17 1.04 1.05 1.05 64.70 61.63 2.76 3.37
58.219.162.7629.7568.049.021.197.0Kseitivitca ecnarusni dna laicnaniF    
22.4186.1123.9297.2287.057.047.029.0N-Msecivres lanoisseforP    
    Public administration, defence, education, 
    human health and social work activities O-Q 0.96 1.01 1.01 0.98 30.44 30.91 20.16 22.71
    Arts, entertainment, recreation; other services 
    and service activities, etc. R-U 0.78 0.80 0.83 0.84 17.97 21.46 7.58 6.01
Total economy (EU12 sector structure) (b) A-U 0.94 0.90 0.95 0.94 31.18 33.00
Labour productivity 
in 2016 (a)
Sector worked hours  
share in 2016
Labour productivity ratio ES/EU12
NACE
code
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sectors or stem from different allocation of resources across sectors. As a first approach, we 
estimate the counterfactual labour productivity levels for Spain combining the EU12 sectoral 
structure with the Spanish sectoral productivities. As shown in the last line of Table 1 the 
sectoral specialization is part of the story given that the productivity gap would be slightly 
lower with respect to EU12: 0.91 versus 0.94 in 2016. However, there was no converge so 
this counterfactual suggests that genuine productivity differences play an important role in 
explaining the Spain-EU12 gap.
 In order to further explore this issue, Table 2 presents a decomposition of the 
productivity gap 
 

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



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equivalent to the ratio from Table 1 into two components: a 
first component capturing labour productivity differentials between Spain and EU12 by sector 
(genuine productivity differences), and a second component that captures the differences 
in the sectoral specialization of employment of Spain vis-à-vis EU12 (composition effect).
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where  LPEU12i  denotes the productivity level for EU12 of industry i and  LPESi  the productivity 
level for Spain in industry i. Weights 
 
H
H
ES
tot
ES
i  and  
 
H
H
EU12
tot
EU12
i  are the shares of industry i in total hours 
worked in Spain and EU12 respectively.
Table 2 provides this decomposition in a horizontal reading for each sector and 
year, i.e. by column: (1) = (2) + (3). The productivity differences component is positive 
(negative) when Spain displayed higher (lower) productivity levels than its EU12 counterpart. 
Turning to the composition effect component, the interpretation is as follows: for sector- 
specific contributions such as that of professional services, a positive (negative) composition 
effect contribution simply captures that the Spanish employment share in this sector is higher 
(lower) than that of EU12 countries. However, for aggregate contributions such as total 
economy, manufacturing, or services, a positive (negative) contribution implies that Spain has 
higher (lower) employment shares relative to EU12 in sectors with high-productivity within 
each aggregate. Therefore, for the total economy, industrial, manufacturing, and services 
aggregates in Table 2, the composition effect characterises the differences in allocation of 
labour of the Spanish economy vis-à-vis the average EU12 country.
Also, Table 2 provides a vertical reading showing the sectors’ contributions to the 
overall labour productivity gap for each of the two components. In fact, the contribution of 
each sector to the productivity gap11 is also the sum of the two components explained in 
equation [2]. 
11 See Annex 3 for additional information on the calculation of the sectors’ contributions to the productivity gap.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 18 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 2006
DECOMPOSITION OF THE PRODUCTIVITY GAP AND SECTORS’ CONTRIBUTIONS: SPAIN VS EU12
Constant 2010 PPPs
Table 2
SOURCE: Banco de España based on Eurostat.
NOTES: (1) = (2) + (3). The sum of each sector contribution equals the productivity gap, the productiviy differential and the compostion effect 
respectively.
a For the productivity gap of the total economy a negative (positive) sign indicates a productivity disadvantage (advantage) vis-à-vis EU12.
b Real estate not included.
2000 2016 2000 2016 2000 2016
5.4-4.5-8.4-3.3-3.9-7.8-)b( ymonoce latoT
2000 2016 2000 2016 2000 2016
6.08.03.05.0-0.13.0gninim dna erutlucirgA
6.09.08.06.04.14.1erutlucirgA    
0.01.0-5.0-0.1-4.0-1.1-gniyrrauq dna gniniM    
4.2-2.1-7.0-4.1-1.3-7.2-rotces lairtsudnI
3.2-6.0-0.1-7.1-3.3-3.2-gnirutcafunaM    
        Food products; beverages and tobacco products 0.1 0.2 -0.3 -0.6 0.3 0.7
        Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products 0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.4 0.2
1.0-0.02.0-0.02.0-0.0noitcudorper dna gnitnirp ,repap ,dooW        
0.01.0-1.11.01.10.0stcudorp muelortep denifer dna ekoC        
1.01.0-6.0-2.0-4.0-3.0-stcudorp lacimehc dna slacimehC        
        Rubber and plastic products and other 
        non-metallic mineral products 0.4 -0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.3
        Basic metals and fabricated metal products, except 
        machinery and equipment 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 -0.5
9.0-5.0-2.0-3.0-1.1-8.0-tnempiuqe lacitpo dna lacirtcelE        
9.0-9.0-2.0-2.0-1.1-1.1-.c.e.n tnempiuqe dna yrenihcaM        
5.0-3.06.0-6.0-1.1-3.0-tnempiuqe tropsnarT        
        Other manufacturing; repair and installation 
        of machinery and equipment -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
1.0-6.0-3.03.02.04.0-ylppus sag dna yticirtcelE    
6.0-6.35.17.09.03.4noitcurtsnoC
1.2-6.8-9.5-1.2-0.8-7.01-)b( secivreS
6.37.12.4-9.2-6.0-2.1-edart liater dna elaselohW    
6.0-7.0-2.0-4.07.0-3.0-egarots dna noitatropsnarT    
6.12.11.22.37.34.4secivres doof dna noitadomoccA    
1.1-1.1-3.05.09.0-6.0-secivres noitacinummoc dna noitamrofnI    
9.1-9.1-5.0-9.0-5.2-8.2-seitivitca ecnarusni dna laicnaniF    
3.2-9.3-3.2-6.0-6.4-5.4-secivres lanoisseforP    
    Public administration, defence, education, human health 
    and social work activities -5.2 -2.7 -0.7 -0.3 -4.5 -2.4
    Arts, entertainment, recreation; other services 
    and service activities, etc. -0.4 0.2 -1.1 -0.8 0.6 1.0
Sectors
Productivity gap contributions  
by sector (pp)
(1)
Productivity differential 
contributions by sector (pp)
(2)
Composition effect 
contributions by sector (pp)
(3)
Productivity gap (%) (a)
(1)
Productivity differential (pp)
(2)
Composition effect (pp)
(3)
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For the total economy the negative productivity gap widened from 8.7% in 2000 
to 9.3% in 2016, which correspond to the ratios of 0.913 and 0.907 respectively in both 
years in Table 1. The services sector is the main responsible of this productivity gap 
(as it contributes 8.0 pp in 2016 out of –9.3). In particular, professional services and 
financial and insurance activities12 account for the higher contribution to the overall 
productivity gap. The negative contribution of the manufacturing sector to the total 
economy productivity gap is also significant (–3.1 pp in 2016). The electrical and 
optical equipment, machinery equipment and transport equipment have contributed the 
most to the negative productivity gap while food products, basic metals and electricity and gas 
supply are the only sectors contributing positively within the industrial sector. These negative 
contributions to the overall gap from services and manufacturing are partially compensated by 
the positive contribution of agriculture (+1.0 pp) and construction (+0.9 pp).
Regarding the decomposition analysis in equation [2], i.e. horizontal reading of 
columns (2) and (3) in Table 2, genuine differentials in productivity levels play an important 
role in explaining the overall productivity gap (–4.8 pp in 2016 out of –9.3 pp). This means that 
productivity levels in Spain are lower than in EU12 for most sectors. Still, the composition 
component also explains a significant share of the overall gap in 2016, namely, –4.5 pp out 
of –9.3 pp. This negative composition effect implies that the sectoral structure of the Spanish 
economy in terms of employment is indeed biased towards low-productivity activities in 
EU12, as also suggested by the shift-share exercise in the last row of Table 1. We interpret 
this finding as a clear indication of potential improvements in the allocation of resources 
across sectors in the Spanish economy. 
In order to have a better understanding of the composition effect, Chart 3 shows the 
relationship between the EU12 productivity level in 2016 and the labour share differentials of 
Spain against EU12 in manufacturing and services subsectors (see equation [2] composition 
effect component). The negative slope is consistent with the negative composition effect 
shown in Table 2 and indicates the scope for potential improvements in Spanish productivity 
through labour reallocation toward subsectors with higher productivity level: the higher the 
negative slope, the larger the scope. As it can be seen, the scope is higher in services than 
in manufacturing subsectors.
Turning to the analysis of individual sectors, in the case of services, the role of 
productivity differential is more important. In particular, in 2016, it accounts for –5.9 pp 
out of the total –8.0 pp services contribution to the whole economy gap. This implies that 
services industries in Spain are indeed less productive than their EU12 counterparts. 
However, the negative contribution from the composition effect (–2.1 pp) indicates 
that, within services, potential gains could be accrued through enhanced allocative 
efficiency within services sectors. In fact, as shown in Table A2.3 of Annex 2 the differential of 
employment shares between Spain and EU12 is positive in 2016 (1.1 pp) indicating that the 
12 Without taking into consideration Public administration, defense, education, human health and social work activities.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 20 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 2006
share of hours worked in the services sector is higher in Spain relative to EU12 countries, 
however the contribution of the composition effect is negative. To explain this feature we 
need to go deeper into the services sector structure. We find that higher productivity levels in 
some services sectors of the Spanish economy are related to relatively smaller employment 
shares and, also, some sectors with relatively lower productivity levels displayed higher 
employment shares. In these cases, the productivity and structural component have the 
opposite sign. For instance, the sector wholesale and retail trade present a clear productivity 
disadvantage in Spain (with a productivity differential contribution of –4.2 pp) but a much 
higher weight in terms of employment shares (as shown in the positive contribution from the 
composition effect of +3.6 pp). By contrast, the productivity advantage of Spain in information 
and communication services (with a productivity differential contribution of 0.3 pp) is more 
than offset by the relative lower share of this sector (which is translated into a negative 
contribution of the composition effect of –1.1pp). Such features illustrate two characteristics 
of the Spanish economy: i) the well-known deficit in high-tech activities of the Spanish 
economy, and ii) that Spain is more specialised in low productivity activities. Furthermore, for 
some service subsectors, namely professional services, public administration and financial 
and insurance activities they not only have a negative productivity gap contribution [column 
(2) of Table 2] but also lower shares in overall activities explaining the negative contribution 
of the composition effect in column [3). 
Regarding the industrial sector, the composition effect explains most of its negative 
contribution to the overall gap (–2.4 pp out of –3.1 pp in the year 2016), which points to 
relatively lower shares in high-productivity sectors within manufacturing in comparison to EU12. 
In particular, we observe that some sectors exhibiting higher employment shares compared 
to EU12 show relatively lower productivity as indicated by the opposite signs of the two 
components of our decomposition, namely, negative in the case of productivity differentials 
and positive in the case of the composition effect. This is the case for several manufacturing 
COMPOSITION EFFECT. 2016
Chart 3
SOURCE: Banco de España based on Eurostat.
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sectors such as food products, textile, and chemical products sectors. On the contrary, sectors 
with relatively high productivity levels within manufacturing such as basic metals show 
relatively lower shares of employment. We interpret these patterns as an indication of 
potential scope for improvements in the allocation of resources (employment) across sectors 
within manufacturing.13 
In sum, we observe in both manufacturing and services a negative contribution 
from productivity differentials as well as a negative contribution from composition effects. 
This indicates that not only Spain presents lower productivity levels in most sectors vis-à-
vis other EU12 countries, but also exhibits higher employment shares in low-productivity 
activities. Both components explain half of the aggregate productivity gap in levels for the 
year 2016. Also, the role of composition is relatively more important within manufacturing 
than within services. In the services sector genuine productivity differential explains most 
of the gap in levels.
4.2 Changes in the productivity gap by sector over the period 2000-2016
The previous section concluded that most sectors in industry and services show negative 
productivity gaps in levels and that the Spanish economy is biased towards low-productivity 
sectors vis-à-vis other EU12 countries. We now turn to the evolution over time of the sectoral 
productivities (see Chart 3) as well as the decomposition of the changes in the productivity 
gaps (see Table 3). 
According to the patterns in Chart 4, productivity growth in the manufacturing 
sector exceeded that of utilities (electricity, gas and water supply) and construction, and 
it grew at similar rates in both Spain and EU12. In the case of construction, productivity 
growth followed a counter-cyclical pattern mainly due the employment destruction 
experienced during the recession years, which was larger in Spain than in EU12 
countries. Manufacturing productivity growth was driven by efficiency gains in industries 
with relatively higher capacity for innovation. A group of medium- and high-technology 
industries seemed to drive productivity growth, exhibiting the highest average annual 
productivity growth rates: transport equipment and electrical and optical equipment 
for the case of Spain, plus chemicals and chemical in the case of EU12 countries (see 
Charts 4.3 and 4.4).
In the case of services, the heterogeneity in productivity growth of the different sub-
sectors is substantial in the case of Spain. Sectors such as information and communication 
activities, financial and insurance activities, and to a lesser extent, wholesale and retail 
trade exhibited strong productivity growth from 2000 to 2016. These are also the sub-
sectors with higher productivity growth in EU12 countries. In contrast, sub-sectors such 
as accommodation and food services activities and professional services presented a fall 
13  Tables A2.1 and A2.2 in Annex 2 provides additional information on this discussion showing the evolution of labour 
productivity levels as well as the share of working hours in Spain and EU12.
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CHANGES IN THE PRODUCTIVITY GAP AND ITS DECOMPOSITION: SPAIN VS EU12
Constant 2010 PPPs
Table 3
SOURCE: Banco de España based on Eurostat.
NOTES: (1) = (2) + (3). Changes calculated as the difference between the end and the beginning of the period.
a Real estate not included.
2000-2016 2000-2016 2000-2016
9.05.1-6.0-)a( ymonoce latoT
2000-2016 2000-2016 2000-2016
2.0-8.06.0gninim dna erutlucirgA
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        mineral products 5.0-2.0-7.0-
        Basic metals and fabricated metal products, 
        except machinery and equipment
5.0-2.03.0-
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0.00.00.0.c.e.n tnempiuqe dna yrenihcaM        
8.0-0.08.0-tnempiuqe tropsnarT        
        Other manufacturing; repair and installation 
        of machinery and equipment 1.01.02.0
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5.68.3-7.2 secivreS
9.13.1-6.0edart liater dna elaselohW    
1.05.0-4.0-egarots dna noitatropsnarT    
4.01.1-8.0-secivres doof dna noitadomoccA    
1.0-2.0-3.0-secivres noitacinummoc dna noitamrofnI    
0.03.03.0seitivitca ecnarusni dna laicnaniF    
7.17.1-0.0secivres lanoisseforP    
    Public administration, defence, education, human health
    and social work activities 1.24.06.2
    Arts, entertainment, recreation; other services 
    and service activities, etc. 4.03.07.0
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REAL VALUE ADDED PER HOUR WORKED CUMULATIVE GROWTH. SECTORAL ANALYSIS (2000 = 1)
Chart 4
SOURCE: Eurostat.
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in labour productivity in Spain much more pronounced than that of EU12 countries. While 
these patterns are informative about the heterogeneity in productivity performance across 
sectors, they do not provide a clear picture of the evolution of the Spain-EU12 productivity 
gap over the 2000-2016 period. 
Turning to the contributions to the productivity gap, Table 3 shows the changes in the 
productivity gap between 2000 and 2016 and its decomposition – productivity differences 
and composition contributions – analogously to the structure of Table 2 for levels. 
The overall lack of convergence between Spain and other EU countries over the 
2000-2016 period (–0.6 pp) is the result of a divergence in terms of productivity differentials 
(contributing in –1.5 pp) offset by an improvement in the composition effects component 
(+0.9 pp), which captures a converge of employment structure in Spain vis-à-vis EU12. 
This aggregate pattern is more marked in the services sector: the strong deterioration of 
the contribution of productivity differentials in services (–3.8 pp) is more than compensated 
by the increases of the contribution of employment shares in services sub-sectors (+6.5 pp), 
which suggests a reallocation of employment towards services. The opposite pattern is 
observed in manufacturing from 2000 to 2016: the improvement in the contribution to the 
productivity differentials (+0.8 pp) is offset by the fall in the contribution of employment 
shares of manufacturing sectors (–1.2 pp). This pattern in composition effects, namely, 
tertiarization of employment, is the result of the late structural transformation of the Spanish 
economy [see González-Díez and Moral-Benito (2019)]. In particular, both in manufacturing 
and construction, the share of hours worked decreased relatively more in Spain than in EU12 
countries, being this fall absorbed by the services sector. 
Beyond the composition effects it is worth highlighting the across-the-board divergence 
in productivity within services sectors. The deterioration in relative productivities is especially 
marked in the case of professional services, wholesale and retail trade, and accommodation and 
food services. In contrast, there is an improvement in productivity differentials within the primary 
and industrial sectors between 2000 and 2016. However, it is important emphasizing that the 
improvement is relatively modest in most sectors and very much influenced by the construction 
and coke and refined petroleum sectors. We thus conclude that relative productivities between 
2000 and 2016 strongly diverged within most services subsectors, while they remained more 
or less stable within manufacturing subsectors.
4.3 The contribution of the different inputs and TFP by sector
An alternative decomposition of the time evolution of the productivity gap is based on the 
growth accounting exercise from EU KLEMS data. As explained in section 2.2, the growth of 
labour productivity can be decomposed into the contribution of labour composition, capital 
per hour worked (distinguishing ICT and non-ICT capital), and total factor productivity 
(TFP). The purpose of this section is to discuss the role that these four factors have played 
in determining the relatively poor growth of labour productivity in Spain in comparison 
to its European peers.
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Chart 5 shows the growth accounting exercise quantifying the contributions of TFP, 
capital deepening, and labour composition to labour productivity growth in Spain and EU12 
countries over the 2000-2016 period. In Spain, on average, labour productivity grew at an annual 
rate of 0.9%. This was mainly due to the contribution of the labour composition (0.4%), as well 
as increases in capital endowments (0.8%), whereas TFP contributed negatively (–0.3%) to 
labour productivity growth. In the case of EU12, labour productivity grew at an annual rate of 
1.0%, being the main contributors the capital services (0.4%) and the TFP (0.4%), while the 
labour composition only contributed 0.2%. These results clearly point to the crucial role of TFP 
in explaining the divergence in labour productivity documented so far. However, this aggregate 
behaviour might hide differences among the different sectors. Table 4 shows the results of the 
growth accounting exercise at the sectoral level over the period 2000-2016 that we discuss next.
The role of labour composition
The contribution of changes in labour composition to productivity growth in Spain was 
larger than in the EU12 for the total economy. The services sector experienced a much larger 
contribution than that of manufacturing (C), especially in sectors such as professional 
services (M-N), transportation and storage (H), and public administration, defense, education, 
human health and social work activities (O-Q) (see Table 4). The improvements observed in 
the composition of labour are also documented in other studies providing a more detailed 
analysis. For instance, Lacuesta et al. (2009) and Lacuesta et al. (2011) conclude that labour 
quality in Spain improved substantially over this period. Chart 6 presents the annualised 
growth of labour services14 showing that in the services sector, which represent more than 
14   Labour services is defined as the hours worked by the different categories of workers in terms of education, age and 
gender weighted by its nominal cost shares (see Annex 1 for more details).
CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROWTH IN VALUE ADDED PER HOUR WORKED
Chart 5
SOURCE: EU KLEMS.
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GROWTH ACCOUNTING EXERCISE: AVERAGE PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE AVERAGE PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN SPAIN AND EU12 (2000-2016)
Table 4
SOURCE: EU Klems. 
NOTE: (1) = (2) + (3) + (4) + (5).
a Weighted average of the subsectors included in the aggregate where the weights are the corresponding working hours share.
b Real estate not included.
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6.0-4.19.01.02.04.01.03.04.01.0-3.01.04.0-2.27.1)a( gnirutcafunaM    
9.0-8.01.0-2.01.03.03.03.06.03.0-2.01.0-7.0-4.16.0stcudorp occabot dna segareveb ;stcudorp dooF        
0.1-8.18.03.02.05.02.0-3.01.01.04.05.08.0-6.28.1stcudorp detaler dna rehtael ,lerappa gniraew ,selitxeT        
4.2-7.17.0-3.01.04.06.02.08.00.02.02.05.1-2.27.0noitcudorper dna gnitnirp ,repap ,dooW        
6.69.0-7.52.03.05.04.05.19.14.0-5.01.07.65.12.8stcudorp muelortep denifer dna ekoC        
1.1-9.18.02.06.07.03.0-5.02.03.0-2.01.0-6.1-2.36.1stcudorp lacimehc dna slacimehC        
        Rubber and plastic products and other non-metallic mineral products 1.4 2.1 -0.7 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.3 -0.2 1.4 -1.6
        Basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machinery 
        and equipment 2.6 1.9 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.2 1.7 1.3 0.5
4.0-8.24.20.04.04.04.02.06.05.0-3.02.0-5.0-7.32.3tnempiuqe lacitpo dna lacirtcelE        
2.0-0.17.01.04.05.00.02.02.03.0-3.00.05.0-8.14.1.c.e.n tnempiuqe dna yrenihcaM        
6.07.13.22.0-6.04.03.0-3.00.01.03.04.01.09.20.3tnempiuqe tropsnarT        
        Other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and equipment 1.9 1.5 0.4 -0.2 0.2 -0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.2 1.7 1.0 0.6
8.0-7.0-4.1-4.00.04.03.06.09.01.00.01.01.01.0-0.0ylppus sag dna yticirtcelE    
0.1-5.0-5.1-0.00.00.06.13.09.10.02.02.06.00.07.0noitcurtsnoC
9.0-1.08.0-1.01.03.01.02.03.02.02.04.04.0-6.02.0)b( )a( secivreS
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4.04.08.01.03.04.06.03.09.02.0-2.00.08.03.11.2seitivitca ecnarusni dna laicnaniF    
7.1-8.0-5.2-3.01.04.00.02.02.05.02.07.09.0-3.0-2.1-secivres lanoisseforP    
    Public administration, defence, education, human health 
    and social work activities 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.5 -0.1 -0.4
    Arts, entertainment, recreation; other services and service activities, etc. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 -1.2 -0.8 -0.5
Productivity growth (%)
(1)
Contributions
Labour composition 
change (pp)
(2)
Non-ICT capital 
services (pp)
(3)
ICT capital 
services (pp)
(4)
Total factor
productivity (pp)
(5)
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70% of total employment, labour services increased relatively more in Spain than in the 
EU12. Therefore the observed relative weakness in labour productivity growth cannot 
be attributed to lower accumulation of human capital of the workforce. 
The role of capital accumulation
The contribution of total capital per hour worked to productivity growth was stronger in 
Spain than in EU12 countries for all sectors. In fact, capital input in Spain grew by 60% over 
the whole period, while in the EU12 it grew by 21%. Distinguishing between ICT and non-ICT 
capital, it turns out that the contribution of both types of capital per hour are higher in Spain, 
though considerably larger for the non-ICT capital. The sectors where the contribution of non-ICT 
capital is greater are construction (F), agriculture (A), transportation and storage (H) and financial 
and insurance activities (K). Regarding the contribution of ICT capital, it was relatively 
strong in the information and communication services (J), but also in several manufacturing 
sectors such as chemical products (C20-C21), textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related 
products (C13-C15) and machinery and equipment (C28) (see Table 4). Therefore, trends in 
capital deepening15 do not seem to explain the relative weakness in trend productivity 
in Spain. In fact, capital accumulation in the various sectors was fast and higher than in 
the EU12. Chart 7 shows the annualised growth of ICT and NON-ICT capital stocks over the 
period under study, where ICT capital grew on average and in all sectors at higher rates than 
in EU12. Regarding non-ICT capital, in Spain, capital stocks grew significantly more in the 
services sector, mainly in the professional services sector (M-N) and wholesale and retail 
trade sector (G).
15 Capital deepening understood as contribution of the rate of growth of capital per hour worked.
LABOUR SERVICES ANNUALISED GROWTH OF SPAIN AND EU12 SECTORAL ANALYSIS (2000-2016)
Chart 6
SOURCE: EU KLEMS.
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The role of TFP growth
TFP growth, is derived residually as the part of output growth that cannot be accounted 
for by inputs accumulation (Solow residual). It is often defined as “technological progress” 
and it captures the effect of different factors such as the capacity of an economy to 
innovate. As suggested by Chart 5, the dismal evolution of TFP is the key factor that 
explains the low performance of labour productivity growth in Spain vis-à-vis EU12 
countries. For the total economy, the Spanish TFP contribution to labour productivity 
growth is not only lower than in the EU12 but even negative. In order to explore in which 
sectors the contribution of TFP is lower, we compute at sectoral level the differences 
on the different contributions to labour productivity growth between Spain and EU12. 
Chart 8 shows the results. 
Sectors in which TFP growth is lower in comparison with EU12 displayed poorer 
labour productivity growth. This is particularly the case for several manufacturing sectors 
– for instance, in the case of chemicals and chemical products (sector C20-C21), the 
difference of the TFP growth between Spain and EU12 is –1.1 pp, and –2.4 pp for wood, 
paper, printing and reproduction (C16-C18) – but also for some service sectors such as 
professional services (M-N), accommodation and food services (I) and transportation and 
storage (H) where the negative contribution of TFP to productivity growth is particularly high. 
On the contrary, in the primary sector (sectors A and B), where the labour productivity growth 
is larger, the contribution of TFP growth is positive and higher than in the EU12.
Therefore, we need to explain why Spanish TFP growth fell behind in most sectors. 
Interestingly enough, we see in Chart 9 that in sectors where the contribution of ICT capital 
CAPITAL STOCK ANNUALISED GROWTH OF SPAIN AND EU12 SECTORAL ANALYSIS (2000-2016)
Chart 7
SOURCE: EU KLEMS.
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AVERAGE PRODUCTIVITY GAINS AND LOSSES AND CONTRIBUTION DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN SPAIN AND EU12.
SECTORAL ANALYSIS (2000-2016)
Chart 8
SOURCE: EU KLEMS. 
NOTE: The dots represent the differences in the average labour productivity growth between ES and EU12 over the period 2000-2016 and the bars 
show the labour composition, ICT and non-ICT capital and TFP contribution differentials to the labour productivity growth differential.
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is larger the contribution of TFP growth is relatively lower and negative. Indeed, Chart 9 
plots such observation where a negative link between ICT contribution and TFP growth is 
observed. However, in theory, the impact of ICT on productivity growth should bring gains 
to labour productivity growth due to capital deepening and/or gains arising from spillover 
effects or embodied technical progress. Though, it seems that Spain is unable to extract all 
these benefits. In the next section we will explore to what extent the population’s skills play 
a role in this TFP divergence. 
ICT CONTRIBUTION AND TFP GROWTH DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN SPAIN AND EU12.
SECTORAL ANALYSIS (2000-2016)
Chart 9 
SOURCE: EU KLEMS.
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5 The role of skills-capital complementarities as a source of TFP divergence
The dismal evolution of Spanish TFP with respect to other advanced countries over the 
2000-2016 period has been widely studied in the literature. Cross-country differences in 
TFP growth may be related to different variables, sometimes difficult to estimate, such as 
rigidities in the labour market, R&D expenditure, Foreign Direct Investment flows, among 
others. Evidence based on firm-level data suggests that the deterioration in the allocation of 
resources across firms is the main responsible of the fall in aggregate productivity during the 
expansion and the mild improvement during the recovery period. In particular, the allocation 
of credit to low-productivity but high-collateral firms can partly explain these developments. 
[see for instance Moral-Benito (2018) and Fu and Moral-Benito (2018)]. 
Alternatively, a recent strand of the literature emphasises the role of management 
practices in the context of the IT revolution. Schivardi and Schmitz (2019) for Southern Europe 
and Pellegrino and Zingales (2019) for Italy in particular, argue that inefficient managerial 
practices in these countries hampered the efficient use of new technologies brought by the 
surge of the IT revolution since the late nineties. In turn, according to the latest release of the 
World Management Survey (WMS), in a scale from 1 to 5 the average score of Spanish firms 
was 2.7 while it was 3.2 in Germany for instance [see Bloom et al. (2014)].
In this paper, we highlight an alternative hypothesis inspired by the fact that the lack 
of convergence in productivity between Spain and the rest of advanced Europe dates back to 
the eighteen century. Indeed, the Spanish deficit in human capital is well-documented even 
since the year 1750 when the literacy rate in Spain was 8% of the population against 85%, 
54%, 48%, and 38% for Netherlands, Great Britain, Sweden, and Germany, respectively 
[see Roser and Ortiz-Ospina (2016).] Making the analogy with the management practices 
hypothesis, if individual’s skills are not good enough to take advantage of new technologies, 
investments in ICT capital will result in lower labour productivity gains and will materialise in 
a lower contribution from TFP. In other words, ICT capital by itself might have little impact 
on productivity, but its impact may be substantial when it is adopted in conjunction with a 
labour force able to take advantage of it.
The paper by Garicano and Heaton (2010) serves as an illustration of the mechanism 
we have in mind: using a sample of US police departments covering 1987-2003, Garicano and 
Heaton (2010) show that IT adoption by each department is associated to lower crime rates or 
higher clearance rates only in those police departments participating in the Compstat program, 
which included, among other things, hiring of skilled officers and training programs. In this 
example, IT adoption consisted of using computers for tasks such as crime investigation based 
on data analysis. If police officers are not well-trained in data analysis, the effect of having a 
computer for recording and analyzing the data would have little impact on clearance rates.
A natural proxy for the skills of the labour force is given by the scores obtained in the 
Program for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) for adult population 
of the OECD Skills Surveys. In terms of both mathematical reasoning (numeracy) and reading 
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comprehension (literacy), Spain is situated in the last and second-to-last position among the 
OECD countries. These figures suggest that the Spanish labour force might present more 
difficulties that that of other countries in taking advantage of new technologies, and this 
would be captured by the TFP divergence in EU KLEMS statistics discussed above.
Formally, the TFP contribution from EU KLEMS data is based on a neoclassical 
production function with unitary elasticity of substitution between all inputs. However, an 
alternative configuration could be a nested-CES function in which adults’ skills enter as 
an additional input and the elasticity of substitution between skills and ICT capital is larger 
than one, i.e. they are gross complements. 
Under the assumption that skills are proxied by a linear function of PIAAC scores, we 
postulate the following regression [see Pellegrino and Zingales (2019) for a related approach]:
 ( ) csscccs2cs10cs PIAAClnICTICTTFP ϑ+ω+µ+θ+θ+θ=
where  ( ) csscccs2cs10cs PIAAClnICTICTTFP ϑ+ω+µ+θ+θ+θ=and  ( ) csscccs2cs10cs PIAAClnICTICTTFP ϑ+ω+µ+θ+θ+θ=  refer to the EU KLEMS TFP and ICT capital contributions to labour 
productivity growth of country c and sector s.  ( ) csscccs2cs10cs PIAAClICTICTTFP ϑ+ω+µ+θ+θ+θ= proxies for TFP contributions at the 
country-sector level net of the skill-ICT capital complementarity. Finally, a set of country and 
sector dummies are also included. 
The parameter of interest is  ( ) csscccs2cs10cs PIAAClnICTICTTFP ϑ+ω+µ+θ+θ+θ= , which captures the complementarity between skills 
and ICT capital. If  ( ) csscccs2cs10cs PIAAClnICTICTTFP ϑ+ω+µ+θ+θ+θ=  > 0, the ICT contribution to TFP is larger in those countries with higher 
PIAAC scores. Despite admittedly simple, we interpret this test as suggestive evidence of 
the presence of complementarities in the production function between ICT capital and skills 
that are incorporated in the TFP contribution in EU KLEMS data. In particular, those countries 
with lower skills would present lower TFP contributions. In case  ( ) csscccs2cs10cs PIAAClnICTICTTFP ϑ+ω+µ+θ+θ+θ=  = 0, the TFP contribution 
would be properly measuring TFP per se and we would conclude that ICT capital and skills 
are not complements in the production function.
Tables 5 and 6 show the estimated coefficients. Table 5 reports the results with 
PIAAC literacy scores and Table 6 with PIAAC numeracy scores. In both tables, column (1) 
reports the baseline specification with PIAAC scores. The estimates of  ( ) csscccs2cs10cs PIAAClnICTICTTFP ϑ+ω+µ+θ+θ+θ=  are positive and 
significant. Interestingly enough, the estimated coefficient turns negative and not statistically 
significant in column (2) when considering non-ICT capital instead of ICT capital, which 
we interpret as placebo-based evidence in favor of our hypothesis since we do not expect 
complementarities between skills and non-ICT capital. Finally columns (3)-(6) show that the 
complementarity of skills and ICT capital is due to two types of ICT capital: R&D investments 
and software, while the estimate is not significant for tangible ICT and other ICT capital. 
In order to gauge the aggregate magnitude of the estimates in Tables 5 we conduct 
the following counterfactual: using the baseline estimate of  ( ) csscccs2cs10cs PIAAClnICTICTTFP ϑ+ω+µ+θ+θ+θ= , we compute the increase in 
Spanish TFP EU KLEMS contribution using the Spanish sector-level ICT contributions but 
interacted with the Finnish PIAAC literacy score of 288 (the 95th percentile of the cross-
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RESULTS OLS REGRESSION USING PIAAC LITERACY SCORES
Table 5
SOURCE: Own calculations.
NOTES: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1.
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RESULTS OLS REGRESSION USING PIAAC NUMERACY SCORES
Table 6
SOURCE: Own calculations.
NOTES: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1.
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country PIAAC distribution) as opposed of the actual PIAAC literacy score of 251 in Spain 
(the 5th percentile). The unweighted average increase in labour productivity growth across 
sectors (without taking into account composition effect) would be 43%. According to EU 
KLEMS, the average annual labour productivity growth over the 2000-2016 was 0.9% in 
Spain and 1% in EU12. In the counterfactual scenario, Spanish labour productivity growth 
could have been 1.3% leading to an average 0.3 pp convergence every year and thus a 5 pp 
convergence over the 16 years (ratio of per capita GDPs from 90% to 95%). 
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6 Conclusion 
Relative to our EU12 benchmark, Spanish labour productivity is around 10% lower. 
This negative productivity gap is due to two facts: i) lower productivity levels in most sectors 
(Spain exhibits a positive productivity gap in only 4 out of 23 sectors: two services 
sectors – accommodation and food services, and information and communication – one 
industrial sector – electricity and gas supply – and agriculture); ii) an allocation of employment 
skewed towards low-productivity sectors.
Turning to the evolution over time, Spain is not catching up. This means that the 
productivity gap with our European peers has widened slightly from 2000 to 2016. This 
divergence is due to a deterioration in relative productivities in most sectors. At the root of 
the lack of convergence is the fact that the productivity gap in services has widened over 
time, together with the greater tertiarisation of the Spanish economy. In particular, this lack 
of convergence vis-à-vis EU12 is especially marked in professional services, wholesale and 
retail trade, and accommodation and food services, while we observe a relative stability in 
productivity gaps within manufacturing sectors.
With respect to the growth accounting decomposition, negative TFP growth in most 
sectors is chiefly responsible for the divergence in the labour productivity gap. This is so 
despite Spain’s relative convergence vis-à-vis EU12 in terms of labour composition, ICT and 
non-ICT capital between 2000 and 2016. Indeed, in those sectors in which the ICT capital 
convergence was stronger, there was a more marked divergence in TFP. According to our 
analysis, the full effects of ICT capital on Spanish TFP growth might not materialise because 
the Spanish population’s skills (proxied by PIAAC scores) do not seem good enough to 
take advantage of new technologies. Thus, this is a possible source of TFP divergence with 
respect other advanced EU countries. 
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Annex 1 Growth accounting exercise. EU KLEMS methodology1
Suppose a generic production function for output Y (measured as value added at constant 
prices) by combining capital K and labour L for every country c, sector s and time t: 
 ( )L,KFAY cstcstcstcstcst ⋅=                                              [1]
A is technology. Capital itself is broken down into two different types: ICT and non-
ICT capital:
 ( )K,KKK NcstIcstcstcst =                                                    [2]
Regarding labour, there are J different categories of workers, which differ by age, 
education and gender. The total labour input is a combination of the hours worked by the 
different categories of workers:
 ( )H,...,HLL Jcst1cst ,H2cstcstcst =                                             [3]
where the total hours worked is defined as: 
 ∑=
=
J
1J
J
cstcst HH                                                           [4]
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale and competitive markets, 
we have:
LWKRYP cstcstcstcstcstcst +=  
KRKRKR NcstNcstIcstIcstcstcst +=  
HWLW Jcst
J
1J
J
cstcstcst ∑=
=  
P, R, R , W I N J
                                             [5]
LWKRYP cstcstcstcstcstcst +=  
KRKRKR NcstNcstIcstIcstcstcst +=  
HWLW Jcst
J
1J
J
cstcstcst ∑=
=  
P, R, R , W I N J
                                              [6]
LWKRYP cstcstcstcstcstcst +=  
KRKRKR NcstNcstIcstIcstcstcst +=  
HWLW Jcst
J
1J
J
cstcstcst ∑=
=  
P, R, R , W I N J
                                                  [7]
where 
LWKRYP cstcstcstcstcstcst +=  
KRKRKR NcstNcstIcstIcstcstcst +=  
HWLW Jcst
J
1J
J
cstcstcst ∑=
=  
P, R, R , W I N J are respectively the prices of output, ICT capital, non-ICT capital and 
type-j labour.
Since the growth accounting methodology is based on a loglinearization of the 
production function, labour productivity growth is then defined as the log-differences of 
value added minus log-difference of hours worked. The decomposition of productivity 
growth into its contribution is shown in equation [8] with hats representing log-changes 
in a variable.
1  Please refer to the “Report on methodologies and data construction for the EU KLEMS Release 2019”. October 29, 
2019. WIIW https://euKLEMS.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Methodology.pdf.
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To summarise, the yearly growth of the labour productivity at the sector level is 
decomposed, in the EU KLEMS database, into the sum of the following contributions:
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Non - ICT contribution: 
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Labour composition change: 
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So that the TFP contribution measured as the growth in labour productivity not 
explained by input and labour composition (i.e. Solow residual) can be expressed as:
TFP growth: 
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However, TFP may be hiding measurement errors on factors production. The growth 
rate of TFP is measured as a residual calculated as the difference between the growth rates 
of output and the combined growth rates of capital and labour weighted by their respective 
elasticities. Therefore, the methodology imposes the need for an accurate measure of 
output, capital, labour and the capital and labour shares in total output. The literature points 
to the following improvements to measure the factors of production: including corrections 
for quality factor (EU KLEMS methodology takes into account age, gender and education of 
workers) and factor utilization (in our study we assume constant factor utilization intensity, 
while intensity of input factor utilization may differ in different business cycle periods). 
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Annex 2 Additional tables and charts
EMPLOYMENT RATE PER SECTOR. RATIO BETWEEN SPAIN AND OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
Chart A2.1
SOURCE: Eurostat.
NOTE: Employment rate defined as the ratio of total employment and total population.
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LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY LEVELS AND SHARE OF WORKING HOURS IN SPAIN
Table A2.1
SOURCE: Banco de España based on Eurostat.
a Constat 2010 PPS.
b Real estate not included.
Sectors
2000 2007 2013 2016 2000 2007 2013 2016
0.0010.0010.0010.0019.924.929.626.62U-A)b( ymonoce latoT
8.40.50.51.72.221.129.716.41B-Agninim dna erutlucirgA
6.48.47.48.63.129.916.619.31AerutlucirgA    
2.02.03.02.03.443.150.937.33Bgniyrrauq dna gniniM    
1.312.316.416.814.440.142.630.03E-Crotces lairtsudnI
0.210.217.317.710.044.632.238.62CgnirutcafunaM    
        Food products; beverages and tobacco products C10-C12 26.2 32.0 28.4 28.5 2.6 2.4 2.7 2.7
        Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products C13-C15 14.3 18.4 21.8 18.8 2.2 1.1 0.9 0.9
0.10.13.16.13.621.928.529.3281C-61Cnoitcudorper dna gnitnirp ,repap ,dooW        
0.01.00.00.07.410,16.385.5910.13291Cstcudorp muelortep denifer dna ekoC        
9.08.08.00.10.860.768.165.9412C-02Cstcudorp lacimehc dna slacimehC        
        Rubber and plastic products and other non-metallic 
        mineral products C22-C23 28.6 30.7 35.5 36.3 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.0
        Basic metals and fabricated metal products, 
        except machinery and equipment C24-C25 31.0 29.9 39.3 45.8 2.7 2.3 1.7 1.7
6.06.08.02.12.542.348.631.5272C-62Ctnempiuqe lacitpo dna lacirtcelE        
8.08.08.09.01.434.836.331.8282C.c.e.n tnempiuqe dna yrenihcaM        
1.10.11.19.19.641.358.342.7203C-92Ctnempiuqe tropsnarT        
        Other manufacturing; repair and installation 
        of machinery and equipment C31-C33 19.4 22.6 26.3 25.2 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.4
1.12.19.09.00.193.686.895.29E-Dylppus sag dna yticirtcelE    
4.63.65.411.211.438.433.221.82FnoitcurtsnoC
7.576.579.563.266.724.725.627.62U-G)b( secivreS
9.813.910.817.718.124.028.817.71Gedart liater dna elaselohW    
7.47.46.47.49.034.030.828.13Hegarots dna noitatropsnarT    
0.85.70.71.60.820.925.829.73Isecivres doof dna noitadomoccA    
8.26.22.22.27.467.066.454.64Jsecivres noitacinummoc dna noitamrofnI    
9.11.29.11.29.754.368.175.44Kseitivitca ecnarusni dna laicnaniF    
7.110.116.98.68.221.223.229.82N-Msecivres lanoisseforP    
    Public administration, defence, education, human health 
    and social work activities O-Q 28.7 30.7 31.4 30.4 16.4 16.1 20.6 20.2
    Arts, entertainment, recreation; other services 
    and service activities, etc. R-U 17.1 17.3 17.8 18.0 6.3 6.6 7.7 7.6
Labour productivity levels (a) Share worked hours per sectorNACE
code
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LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY LEVELS AND SHARE OF WORKING HOURS IN EU12
Table A2.2
SOURCE: Banco de España based on Eurostat.
a Constat 2010 PPS.
b Real estate not included.
Sectors
2000 2007 2013 2016 2000 2007 2013 2016
0.0010.0010.0010.0010.333.236.132.92U-A)b( ymonoce latoT
5.37.30.48.42.127.025.024.91B-Agninim dna erutlucirgA
4.35.38.36.47.510.515.316.11AerutlucirgA    
2.02.02.03.01.4315.3216.9415.951Bgniyrrauq dna gniniM    
7.411.514.619.816.648.346.146.33E-Crotces lairtsudnI
5.319.313.518.716.345.042.835.03CgnirutcafunaM    
        Food products; beverages and tobacco products C10-C12 29.4 32.3 31.6 35.3 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1
        Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products C13-C15 18.1 22.7 25.3 25.0 1.5 0.9 0.7 0.7
0.11.14.16.14.238.034.724.3281C-61Cnoitcudorper dna gnitnirp ,repap ,dooW        
0.01.01.01.06.9524.5017.9614.57191Cstcudorp muelortep denifer dna ekoC        
8.08.09.00.12.095.384.676.6512C-02Cstcudorp lacimehc dna slacimehC        
        Rubber and plastic products and other non-metallic
        mineral products C22-C23 26.5 33.1 34.6 36.6 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.2
        Basic metals and fabricated metal products, 
        except machinery and equipment C24-C25 28.6 32.7 34.4 37.3 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.1
1.12.13.16.10.550.253.648.2372C-62Ctnempiuqe lacitpo dna lacirtcelE        
5.15.16.17.12.140.244.344.4382C.c.e.n tnempiuqe dna yrenihcaM        
4.13.14.17.18.462.958.159.6303C-92Ctnempiuqe tropsnarT        
        Other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery 
        and equipment C31-C33 24.0 28.7 28.9 28.7 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.5
2.12.11.11.13.185.182.982.38E-Dylppus sag dna yticirtcelE    
2.72.78.81.84.627.524.523.62FnoitcurtsnoC
6.470.479.071.865.131.137.030.92U-G)b( secivreS
9.412.513.516.511.927.622.624.22Gedart liater dna elaselohW    
3.52.53.54.50.233.331.335.92Hegarots dna noitatropsnarT    
3.51.50.55.43.916.915.025.22Isecivres doof dna noitadomoccA    
4.33.31.30.36.169.753.256.93Jsecivres noitacinummoc dna noitamrofnI    
8.20.30.31.33.768.764.465.65Kseitivitca ecnarusni dna laicnaniF    
2.414.314.214.013.924.923.035.13N-Msecivres lanoisseforP    
    Public administration, defence, education, human health
    and social work activities O-Q 30.0 30.5 31.2 30.9 20.8 21.2 22.8 22.7
    Arts, entertainment, recreation; other services
    and service activities, etc. R-U 22.0 21.7 21.4 21.5 5.5 5.7 6.0 6.0
NACE
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Table A2.3
SOURCE: Banco de España based on Eurostat.
a Defined as the level difference in percentage points between the labour productivity in Spain versus EU12.
b A negative (positive) sign indicates a productivity disadvantage (advantage) vis-à-vis EU12.
c Differentials of the share of hours worked per sector between Spain versus EU12. A negative (positive) sign indicates a lower (greater) specialization of the corresponding sector in Spain than in UE12.
d Real estate not included.
2000 2007 2013 2016 2000 2007 2013 2016 2000 2007 2013 2016
Total economy (d) -8.7 -15.0 -9.1 -9.3 -2.5 -4.7 -2.9 -3.1 — — — —
3.13.10.12.20.14.06.2-8.4-8.47.18.21-8.42-gninim dna erutlucirgA
    Agriculture 20.4 22.9 32.5 36.2 2.4 3.1 4.9 5.7 2.3 0.9 1.3 1.3
0.00.01.00.07.98-2.27-7.011-8.521-9.66-4.85-0.47-9.87-gniyrrauq dna gniniM    
Industrial sector -10.8 -13.0 -6.5 -4.8 -3.6 -5.4 -2.9 -2.2 -0.3 -1.8 -1.9 -1.6
    Manufacturing -12.0 -15.7 -10.2 -8.3 -3.7 -6.0 -4.1 -3.6 -0.1 -1.6 -1.9 -1.5
7.07.03.03.07.6-2.3-4.0-2.3-1.91-2.01-1.1-9.01-stcudorp occabot dna segareveb ;stcudorp dooF        
2.02.02.07.02.6-4.3-4.4-8.3-6.42-5.31-2.91-2.12-stcudorp detaler dna rehtael ,lerappa gniraew ,selitxeT        
1.0-1.0-0.01.0-1.6-6.1-6.1-6.07.81-3.5-7.5-4.2noitcudorper dna gnitnirp ,repap ,dooW        
0.00.00.00.01.5578.12-8.526.559.0927.02-2.517.13stcudorp muelortep denifer dna ekoC        
0.00.01.0-0.02.22-5.61-6.41-1.7-6.42-8.91-1.91-5.21-stcudorp lacimehc dna slacimehC        
3.0-3.0-0.02.03.0-0.14.2-1.27.0-8.23.7-9.7stcudorp larenim cillatem-non rehto dna stcudorp citsalp dna rebbuR        
        Basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 8.2 -8.4 14.1 22.8 2.3 -2.7 4.9 8.5 0.0 -0.2 -0.5 -0.4
5.0-6.0-5.0-4.0-8.9-8.8-5.9-7.7-9.71-9.61-6.02-5.32-tnempiuqe lacitpo dna lacirtcelE        
7.0-8.0-8.0-8.0-1.7-6.3-9.9-3.6-2.71-6.8-8.22-2.81-.c.e.n tnempiuqe dna yrenihcaM        
3.0-3.0-3.0-2.09.71-0.6-0.8-7.9-6.72-2.01-4.51-3.62-tnempiuqe tropsnarT        
        Other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and equipment -19.2 -21.3 -9.1 -12.3 -4.6 -6.1 -2.6 -3.5 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2
0.00.02.0-2.0-7.99.44.93.90.210.65.011.11ylppus sag dna yticirtcelE    
Construction 6.6 -12.1 35.1 29.3 1.7 -3.1 9.0 7.7 3.9 5.8 -1.0 -0.8
Services (d) -7.8 -13.8 -12.0 -12.5 -2.3 -4.2 -3.7 -3.9 -5.9 -5.0 1.6 1.1
1.41.47.22.23.7-3.6-4.7-7.4-0.52-8.32-1.82-1.12-edart liater dna elaselohW    
6.0-5.0-6.0-7.0-1.1-9.2-0.5-2.25.3-7.8-2.51-5.7egarots dna noitatropsnarT    
7.24.20.26.16.83.90.84.517.445.742.935.86secivres doof dna noitadomoccA    
6.0-6.0-9.0-8.0-1.38.23.28.60.59.43.41.71secivres noitacinummoc dna noitamrofnI    
9.0-9.0-1.1-0.1-3.9-4.4-4.70.21-9.31-5.6-5.112.12-seitivitca ecnarusni dna laicnaniF    
5.2-4.2-8.2-6.3-5.6-3.7-0.8-6.2-3.22-9.42-4.62-3.8-secivres lanoisseforP    
    Public administration, defence, education, human health and social work activities -4.4 0.6 0.7 -1.5 -1.3 0.2 0.2 -0.5 -4.4 -5.1 -2.2 -2.5
    Arts, entertainment, recreation; other services and service activities, etc. -22.2 -20.5 -16.7 -16.3 -4.9 -4.5 -3.6 -3.5 0.8 0.8 1.7 1.6
Productivity gap
(%) (a) (b)
Labour productivity level differentials
(constant 2010 PPPs per hour worked) (b)
Share of hours worked differentials
(pp) (c)
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CHANGES IN THE PRODUCTIVITY GAP CHANGES IN ITS DECOMPOSITION: SPAIN VS EU12
Table A2.4
SOURCE: Banco de España based on Eurostat.
NOTES: (1) = (2) + (3). Changes calculated as the differnece between the end and the beginning of the period.
a Real estate not included.
2000-2016 2000-2007 2007-2013 2013-2016 2000-2016 2000-2007 2007-2013 2013-2016 2000-2016 2000-2007 2007-2013 2013-2016
3.07.01.0-9.05.0-2.52.6-5.1-2.0-9.53.6-6.0-economy (a) latoT
2000-2016 2000-2007 2007-2013 2013-2016 2000-2016 2000-2007 2007-2013 2013-2016 2000-2016 2000-2007 2007-2013 2013-2016
1.02.0-0.02.0-0.09.01.0-8.01.07.01.0-6.0gninim dna erutlucirgA
    Agriculture -0.1 -0.6 0.5 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.3 0.1 -0.3 -0.5 0.2 0.0
1.04.0-5.01.01.0-6.00.06.00.02.05.07.0gniyrrauq dna gniniM    
4.03.09.1-2.1-3.07.02.0-8.06.01.12.2-5.0-rotces lairtsudnI
5.02.0-0.2-8.1-1.08.02.0-7.06.06.02.2-1.1-gnirutcafunaM    
1.03.00.04.03.0-2.0-3.03.0-2.0-1.02.01.0stcudorp occabot dna segareveb ;stcudorp dooF        
0.00.03.0-3.0-1.0-1.01.01.00.01.02.0-2.0-stcudorp detaler dna rehtael ,lerappa gniraew ,selitxeT        
0.01.0-0.00.01.0-0.01.0-2.0-1.0-1.0-1.0-2.0-noitcudorper dna gnitnirp ,repap ,dooW        
0.01.00.01.01.11.0-1.0-0.11.10.00.01.1stcudorp muelortep denifer dna ekoC        
1.02.01.0-2.02.0-1.0-1.0-3.0-0.01.02.0-1.0-stcudorp lacimehc dna slacimehC        
        Rubber and plastic products and other non-metallic mineral products -0.7 -0.5 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 0.0
        Basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment -0.3 -0.6 0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.4 0.5 0.2 -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 0.0
0.01.0-3.0-4.0-0.01.01.01.00.01.0-2.0-3.0-tnempiuqe lacitpo dna lacirtcelE        
1.01.02.0-0.01.0-2.00.00.00.03.02.0-0.0.c.e.n tnempiuqe dna yrenihcaM        
1.0-1.08.0-8.0-4.0-1.03.00.05.0-1.05.0-8.0-tnempiuqe tropsnarT        
        Other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and equipment 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.1
1.0-6.01.05.02.01.0-0.01.01.05.01.06.0ylppus sag dna yticirtcelE        
Construction -3.4 -1.1 -2.2 -0.1 0.8 -2.1 3.2 -0.3 -4.2 1.1 -5.4 0.1
Services (a) 2.7 -3.0 6.4 -0.8 -3.8 -3.8 0.5 -0.6 6.5 0.8 6.0 -0.2
2.02.15.09.14.0-4.03.1-3.1-2.0-6.18.0-6.0edart liater dna elaselohW    
1.0-2.00.01.03.03.01.1-5.0-2.05.01.1-4.0-egarots dna noitatropsnarT    
1.01.01.04.00.04.04.1-1.1-1.05.04.1-8.0-secivres doof dna noitadomoccA    
0.03.04.0-1.0-0.01.03.0-2.0-0.04.07.0-3.0-secivres noitacinummoc dna noitamrofnI    
0.03.03.0-0.03.0-7.0-3.13.03.0-4.0-0.13.0seitivitca ecnarusni dna laicnaniF    
1.0-4.03.17.12.01.0-8.1-7.1-1.04.06.0-0.0secivres lanoisseforP    
    Public administration, defence, education, human health and social work activities 2.6 0.4 2.9 -0.7 0.4 0.8 0.0 -0.4 2.1 -0.5 2.9 -0.3
    Arts, entertainment, recreation; other services and service activities, etc. 0.7 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 -0.1 0.6 -0.1
Changes in the productivity gap (pp) 
(1)
Changes in the productivity differential (pp)
(2)
Changes in the composition effect (pp)
(3)
Sectors
Productivity gap contributions 
by sector (pp) (1)
Productivity differential contributions 
by sector (pp) (2)
Composition effect contributions 
by sectors (pp) (3)
Constant 2010 PPPs
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Annex 3 Gap descomposition by sector contributions
The formula used for the sector contributions to the productivity gap is as follows:
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 denotes the productivity level for EU12 of industry i and 
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level for Spain in industry i. Weights 
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 are the shares of industry i in total hours 
worked in Spain and EU12 respectively.
The intuition behind this formula is:
— If EU12 – our benchmark – is an economy with the same productivity levels in 
each sector and the economic structure (in terms of hours worked) in Spain 
is similar to the one of UE12, 
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 would be equal to 1 for each 
i sector. In this case, the global gap would be simply the weighted average 
of sector gaps, being the weights equal to the hour share of the corresponding 
sector in Spain.
—  If EU12 has different levels of productivity in each sector, the formula corrects 
each sector contribution to the global gap taking into account if the sector 
productivity is above (below) its global productivity, i. e. if 
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 is greater 
(smaller) than 1. 
— Finally, if the Spanish economic structure (in terms of hours) differs from the 
EU12 structure, the formula adjusts each sector contribution to the global gap 
by subtracting the relative hours share differentials between EU12 and Spain in 
each sector. This means that if the i sector had a productivity disadvantage 
in Spain, its negative contribution to the Spanish global gap would be larger in 
the case in which the EU12 economy had a greater hour share than in Spain, 
i. e. 
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–  > 0. On the contrary, if the hour share differential was favorable 
to Spain, i. e. 
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–  < 0, its negative contribution would be lower than in the 
case of equal hour shares in i sector.
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